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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
   
No. 20-2946 
   
 





             Appellant 
 
      
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(District Court No. 2-11-cr-00132-001) 
District Judge: Honorable J. Nicholas Ranjan 
      
 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on March 12, 2021 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges 
 







   
OPINION* 
   
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, 
Appellant Russell Freed seeks our review of the District Court’s denial of his motion 
for compassionate release.  For the reasons stated below, we affirm the District Court’s 
decision. 
I.  
In 2010, Freed found explicit pictures of his stepdaughter and her friends on his 
stepdaughter’s cell phone.  United States v. Freed, 566 F. App’x 162, 163 (3d Cir. 2014).  
Armed with those images, he created a fake Facebook account and email address in his 
stepdaughter’s name and used them to convince his stepdaughter’s friends to send him 
more sexually explicit images.  He also used other fake email addresses and a prepaid cell 
phone to pose as one of the girls’ peers and obtain more explicit images.  After a girl sent 
him pictures, Freed would threaten to publish the images he had unless the girl sent him 
more pictures.  At least one of the girls refused his demands, and he retaliated by sending 
explicit pictures of her to her family and classmates. 
Freed also anonymously extorted explicit pictures from his stepdaughter, with 
whom he had lived for over ten years.  His stepdaughter, who apparently had no idea he 
was behind the scheme, confided in him that she was contemplating suicide because of the 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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threats.  Freed advised her to comply with the person’s demands and continued to extort 
her for more images.   
In May 2011, law enforcement conducted a planned traffic stop of Freed’s vehicle 
and found about 700 sexually explicit images on his prepaid phone.  A federal grand jury 
later indicted Freed on seven child-pornography-related counts: two counts of production, 
two counts of attempted production, two counts of distribution and receipt, and one count 
of possession.  Freed pled guilty to all seven counts.  His advisory Guidelines range was 
life imprisonment with a fifteen-year mandatory minimum.  The District Court ultimately 
sentenced Freed to twenty years’ imprisonment.  He appealed his sentence, arguing that it 
was procedurally and substantively unreasonable, but we affirmed the District Court.   
Freed later moved for compassionate release in response to the COVID-19 
pandemic.  He argued he was at higher risk of serious disease because he has high blood 
pressure, high cholesterol, and celiac disease.1  United States v. Freed, No. 2:11-cr-00132-
NR, 2020 WL 5604057, at * 6 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2020).  The District Court denied Freed’s 
motion.  The Court held that Freed had not established “extraordinary and compelling 
circumstances,” in part because he could not demonstrate “an actual, non-speculative, and 
non-generalized risk of exposure to COVID-19” at FCI Fort Dix, where he is serving his 
sentence.  Id.  At that time, there were no COVID cases at Fort Dix.  Id.  The Court 
alternatively held that even if Freed had established extraordinary and compelling 
 
1 In addition, Freed is fifty-two years old, has had cysts on his thyroid surgically removed, 
and does not have a spleen because he previously suffered from Hodgkin’s disease.   
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circumstances, the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) still weighed heavily against 
his release.  Id. at *6–*8.  Freed now appeals to us.2 
II.  
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) provides that a court “may reduce” a defendant’s term of 
imprisonment if, among other things, “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justify the 
reduction in light of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.  Here, even assuming Freed has 
demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons for modification, the § 3553(a) 
sentencing factors weigh heavily against a reduction in his sentence.  We therefore affirm 
the District Court. 
A. Extraordinary and Compelling Circumstances 
At the outset, Freed argues that the District Court erred in concluding that he did 
not show extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction.  Freed also argues 
that Fort Dix has experienced a COVID outbreak in the months since the District Court’s 
decision, and thus he has a non-speculative risk of exposure to the disease.3  In light of 
Freed’s various physical ailments and the COVID outbreak at his facility, we assume for 
the sake of argument that Freed has shown extraordinary and compelling circumstances. 
 
2 We have subject-matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and appellate jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
3 And indeed, while this appeal was pending, Freed informed us that he contracted COVID.  
While we are sympathetic to Freed’s situation, this fact does not change our analysis.  Even 
with the assumption—which has now become reality—that Freed could contract COVID, 
the § 3553(a) sentencing factors counsel strongly against his release. 
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B. Section 3553(a) Sentencing Factors 
The § 3553(a) factors, however, weigh heavily against release and provide an 
independent ground for affirmance.4  We review the District Court’s determination 
concerning the § 3553(a) factors for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Pawlowski, 967 
F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020). 
  We cannot conclude that the District Court abused its discretion, as we fully agree 
with its thorough and thoughtful analysis.  It held that the § 3553(a) factors weighed against 
release in light of “the nature and circumstances of the offenses[] and the need for the 
sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, 
to provide just punishment for the offense, to afford adequate deterrence, and to protect the 
public from further crimes of Mr. Freed.”  Freed, 2020 WL 5604057, at * 7.  The Court 
emphasized that Freed’s offenses were “serious” and “severe,” particularly because they 
involved minor victims and drove Freed’s own stepdaughter to contemplate suicide.  Id.  
Freed did not stop even when he knew how his crimes were affecting his stepdaughter.  Id.  
The Court also noted that Freed committed his offenses while “sitting in his car and in his 
home,” and if released, he could commit similar crimes “without ever walking out the front 
 
4 The sentencing factors are: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history 
and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed (a) to reflect the 
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment 
for the offense, (b) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, (c) to protect the 
public from further crimes of the defendant, and (d) to provide the defendant with needed 
training, care, or treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentences 
available; (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for the category 
of offense in the Sentencing Guidelines; (5) any pertinent policy statement by the 
Sentencing Commission; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among 
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the 
need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
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door.”  Id. at *8.  We reiterate the Court’s conclusion that Freed’s sentence should continue 
to reflect the egregiousness of his crimes. 
We also agree with the District Court that the nature of Freed’s sentence weighs 
against reduction.  The Guidelines advised life imprisonment for Freed’s crimes, yet his 
sentence was much less—five years more than the mandatory minimum.  Id.  And Freed 
has served just eight years of his twenty-year sentence.  Id.; see also Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 
at 330–31 (explaining that time remaining to be served may be taken into account in 
considering whether to grant compassionate release).  We therefore join the District Court 
in concluding that the “confluence of sentencing factors” in this particular case counsels 
against reduction.  See id. at *8 n.5. 
*    *    *    *    * 
 For the reasons above, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
